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Abstract
We analyze the importance of demand from emerging and devel-
oped economies as drivers of the real price of oil over the last two
decades. Using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR)
model that allows us to distinguish between different groups of coun-
tries, we find that demand from emerging economies (most notably
from Asian countries) is more than twice as important as demand
from developed countries in accounting for the fluctuations in the real
price of oil and in oil production. Furthermore, we find that different
geographical regions respond differently to oil supply shocks and oil-
specific demand shocks that drive up oil prices, with Europe and North
America being more negatively affected than emerging economies in
Asia and South America. We demonstrate that this heterogeneity in
responses is not only attributable to differences in energy intensity
in production across regions but also to degree of openness and the
investment share in GDP.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work by Hamilton (1983), a large body of literature has
suggested that there is a significant negative relationship between oil price
increases and economic activity in a number of different countries (see, e.g.,
Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Bjørnland (2000)
and Hamilton (1996, 2003, 2009) among many others). Higher energy prices
typically lead to an increase in production costs and inflation, thereby reduc-
ing overall demand, output and trade in the economy.
Recent findings by Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), however, suggest that
the negative effects of oil price changes may be exaggerated, as previous
papers did not allow for a ’reverse causality’ from macroeconomic variables to
oil prices. Allowing for such a link, they find that oil price shocks have played
a smaller role in US recessions than is commonly understood.1 Subsequently,
Kilian (2009) has shown that if the increase in the oil price is driven by an
increased demand for oil associated with fluctuations in global activity and
not disruptions of supply capacity, economic activity may even be positively
affected, at least in the short run. Corroborating findings for the US and
the Euro area have been documented by Kilian et al. (2009), Kilian and
Park (2009), Lippi and Nobili (2012), Peersman and Van Robays (2012) and
Aastveit (2012) among others.
The steady increase in oil prices and the apparent lack of severe nega-
tive effects on the global economy over the last decade suggests that demand
shocks have been important drivers of the price of oil. Consistent with this
view, Kilian and Murphy (2012) finds that oil supply shocks have accounted
for a smaller fraction of the variability of the real price of oil in more re-
cent periods, implying a greater role for demand shocks as a driver of oil
prices. But from where does the increased demand for oil originate? From
emerging economies, which are growing at a pace twice that of the developed
economies, or from the developed world, which represents the primary source
of demand driving the exports and, thus, growth in emerging economies?
While it is commonly believed that growth in emerging markets (in Asia
in particular) is the main driver of the increased demand for oil (see, e.g.,
the discussion in Kilian (2009), Baumeister and Peersman (2012b) and Hicks
and Kilian (2012)2), no studies have explicitly analyzed this question using
a structural model. Therefore, very little is known about the effect that
1See also Kilian (2008b) and Edelstein and Kilian (2009) for corroborating findings using
a different methodology.
2Hicks and Kilian (2012) show that recent forecast surprises were associated with unex-
pected growth in emerging economies and these forecast surprises were central in driving
up the real price of oil during the mid 2000s.
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increased growth in emerging economies has had on the real price of oil, and
potentially equally important, how economic activity in different regions of
the world is affected by changes in oil prices.
To answer these questions, we estimate a factor augmented vector autore-
gressive (FAVAR) model that includes separate activity factors for emerging
and developed economies in addition to global oil production and the real
price of oil. The advantage of this modeling strategy is that we can preserve
the parsimonious data representation offered by factor modeling techniques,
while also including a large cross section of countries in a single model.3 Tra-
ditionally, empirical studies investigating the interaction between oil prices
and the macro economy have employed one or many small-scale vector au-
toregressions (VAR), typically only including a single country in each model.
This limits the cross sectional potential of the analysis.
To identify the structural shocks in the model, we build on the work of
Kilian (2009), which differentiates between oil supply and demand shocks
in a structural VAR model. The novelty of our study is the identification
of separate demand shocks in emerging and developed economies using the
FAVAR approach. The structural shocks are identified using a mixture of
sign and zero restrictions, which allow for a simultaneous reaction to demand
shocks in emerging and developed countries.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly analyze
the contribution of demand from developed and emerging countries on the
real price of oil. Furthermore, the identification strategy adopted to isolate
the various demand shocks is novel in the oil literature. Finally, given the
large number of countries included in the analysis, this is also the most
comprehensive analysis to date of the relationship between oil prices and
macroeconomic activity.
We have three main findings, which are robust to numerous robustness
checks. First, we show that demand shocks in emerging and developed
economies together account for 50-60 percent of the fluctuations in the real
price of oil over the last two decades. This supports the finding in Kilian
(2009) and others of the importance of global demand in explaining oil price
fluctuations.
Second, demand shocks in emerging markets, particularly in Asia, are
more than twice as important as demand shocks in developed economies in
explaining fluctuations in the real price of oil and global oil production.
Third, we find that countries respond differently to the adverse oil mar-
3The FAVAR model was first introduced by Bernanke et al. (2005) to study the transmission
of monetary policy shocks. Other and more recent applications include, e.g., Boivin et al.
(2009), Eickmeier et al. (2011), Aastveit et al. (2011) and Thorsrud (2012).
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ket shocks that drive up oil prices. In particular, while economic activity in
Europe and the US declines substantially following oil supply or oil-specific
demand shocks, economic activity in emerging markets in Asia and South
America declines by a substantially smaller amount and in some cases ac-
tually temporarily increases (at least following oil supply shocks). While
some of these results relate to the fact that many emerging countries are
commodity exporters that benefit from higher terms of trade, we find that
other factors such as a high investment share in GDP and a high degree of
openness may be important factors explaining the heterogeneity observed in
the responses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes
the model, the identification strategy and the estimation procedure. We
report the results in Section 3. We first describe the estimated factors and
their contributions to the domestic variables. Then, we provide a detailed
description of the impulse responses of the identified shocks and how they
affect changes in the oil price in various historical periods. Section 4 discusses
the robustness of the findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Factor Augmented VAR model
The main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of demand in developed
and emerging economies on fluctuations in the real price of oil. To do so, we
specify a model that includes separate measures for activity in developed and
emerging economies, in addition to global oil production and the real price
of oil. The activity measures are intended to capture the respective shifts in
the demand for oil in developed and emerging markets and are constructed
by applying factor modeling techniques. More precisely, our full model is a
FAVAR that builds on the general setup of Bernanke et al. (2005) and Boivin
et al. (2009).
It is instructive to represent the model in a state space form. Here the
transition equation is specified as:
Ft = β(L)Ft−1 + ut, (1)
where Ft =
[
∆prodt devActt emeActt ∆rpot
]′
are the first differences of
the logarithm of global oil production, an unobserved developed economy
activity factor, an unobserved emerging economy activity factor and the first
difference of the logarithm of the real price of oil, respectively. β(L) is a
conformable lag polynomial of order p, and ut is a 4×1 vector of reduced form
residuals. The structural disturbances follow ut = Ω
1/2εt, with ε ∼ N(0, 1)
and Ω = A0(A0)
′, where Ω is the covariance of the reduced form residuals.
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The observation equation of the system is:
Xt = ΛFt + et, (2)
where Xt =
[
∆prodt X
dev
t X
eme
t ∆rpot
]′
is a N × 1 vector of observable
variables, and Xdevt and X
eme
t are N
dev×1 and N eme×1 vectors of developed
and emerging activity variables, respectively. Λ is a N × 4 matrix of factor
loadings, and et is a N × 1 vector of idiosyncratic, zero mean, disturbances.
2.1 Estimation and model specification
We estimate the reduced form model (equation (1) and (2)) in a two step
procedure: First, the unobserved activity factors for developed and emerg-
ing economies are estimated and identified using the principal components
method. Prior to estimating the factors, all variables are transformed to
induce stationarity, by using the first difference of the logarithm of the re-
spective variable, and standardized. The identified factors are then used as
observed variables in a standard VAR framework. The lag length is set to 4,
and the VAR residuals pass standard diagnostic tests.4 In our baseline model,
N = 66, and we estimate the model over a sample period from 1992:Q1 to
2009:Q4, yielding T = 72 observations.5
To construct distributions for the impulse response functions, and accu-
rately account for the problem of generated regressors in the second estima-
tion step, we employ a residual bootstrap procedure for the entire system
with 5000 replications.6
2.2 Data and Identification
Our data set includes variables from 33 different countries, where we use real
GDP and industrial production as measures of economic activity for each
4As shown in, e.g., Hamilton and Herrera (2004), an overly restrictive lag length can produce
misleading results regarding the effects of oil market shocks on the macro economy, while
increasing the lag length to over one year has negligible effects.
5Bernanke et al. (2005) investigate two different methods for estimating the state space sys-
tem in equations (1) and (2): a two step procedure and a joint estimation using likelihood-
based Gibbs sampling techniques, and they show that the two procedures produce very
similar results. The two step procedure however is simpler and much less computationally
intensive.
6Bai and Ng (2006) show that the least squares estimates obtained from factor-augmented
regressions are
√
T consistent and asymptotically normal if
√
T/N → 0. In our sample,
this is certainly not the case, and bootstrap methods are thus a potential alternative
to the normal approximation, see e.g., Goncalves and Perron (2011). Furthermore, the
confidence bands for the impulse response functions are bias adjusted in the sense that we
use Hall’s percentile intervals (see Hall (1992)).
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country, see Appendix A for details. In total, our sample countries account
for approximately 80 percent of world GDP, measured by purchasing-power-
parity.7
We determine a priori which countries should be considered developed and
emerging economies. Countries that are members of the OECD at the begin-
ning of our sample are considered developed economies. The remaining coun-
tries are considered emerging economies. Accordingly, the following 18 coun-
tries are considered developed economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
The following 15 countries are considered emerging economies: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand.8 Of these countries,
four developed countries (Canada, Denmark, Norway and the UK) and four
emerging countries (Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico) are net oil
exporters over the period (1991-2009).9 However, many other countries are
commodity producers (i.e., Australia, New Zealand and Peru), where export
prices may have been highly correlated with oil prices over the period. See
Table 3 in Appendix B for additional information.
To measure oil production and the real price of oil, we use world crude oil
production, in millions barrels per day, and the US real refiners acquisition
cost of imported crude oil, respectively. The nominal oil price has been
deflated using the US consumer price index. These are the same variables
used in, e.g., Kilian (2009).
Identification in this model is affected by two issues: First, we need to es-
timate the unobserved factors such that the developed economy and emerging
economy factors are identified, and, second, we need to identify the structural
shocks. We discuss how this is achieved in detail below.
2.2.1 Identifying the factors
As described above, two of the factors in our system are observable, ∆prodt
and ∆rpot. Thus, we only need to estimate and identify the two unobserved
activity factors, devActt and emeActt. To obtain unique identification, we
follow the method proposed by Bai and Ng (2011). Here, two unrestricted
factors are first estimated using the principal components based on the vector
7Authors calculations based on 2009 estimates from the IMF.
8Note that Chile, Korea and Mexico are now members of the OECD.
9Although Brazil is not a net oil exporter over the entire period, in recent years Brazil has
been a major producer and a net exporter.
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Xt, defined in equation (2).
10 Then, these factors are organized in the Ft
vector described above and rotated to ensure that they can respectively be
identified as a developed and an emerging activity factor. In particular, we
implement the rotational identification restrictions, which Bai and Ng (2011)
label PC3, such that Λ∗ =
[
Ir Λ2
]′
, where Ir is a 4× 4 identity matrix, and
Λ2 is a (N − 4)× 4 loading matrix.
Rewriting the observation equation as:
X = FΛ′ + e, (3)
where F = (F1, F2, ..., FT )
′ is the T×r matrix of factors and Λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λN)′
is the N × r matrix of factor loadings (with λ1 = (λ1,1, λ1,2, ..., λ1,r)′, the
identified factors (F ∗) and loadings (Λ∗) are easily estimated based on the
unrestricted estimates (F and Λ) as follows: F ∗ = FΛ′r and Λ
∗ = ΛΛ−1r .
The rotation of the initial factor estimates depends on Λr, the upper 4×4
component of Λ, and thus the ordering of the variables in X (in equation (3)).
Therefore, we set the first 4 variables in X to be: ∆prod, xUS, xChina and
∆rpo, which implies that the identified Λ∗ have factor loadings of one on oil
production, US and China GDP, and the price of oil (the observable factors
also have factor loadings of one for their respective variables in the absence
of rotation), respectively. The identified factors and loadings can then be
reordered such that they comply with the ordering provided in equations (1)
and (2).
Importantly, this identification strategy places no restrictions on the cor-
relations between the factors, but still yields r2 = 16 restrictions, thus ensur-
ing unique identification of the factors and loadings (see Bai and Ng (2011)
for details).11
2.2.2 Identifying the shocks
To identify the structural shocks in the FAVAR model, we build on the work
of Kilian (2009), which differentiates between oil supply and demand shocks
in a structural VAR model. The novelty of our study is the identification of
separate demand shocks in emerging and developed economies.
10In our model, the choice of estimating two activity factors is motivated by the economic
question we investigate. However, the different information criteria discussed in Bai and
Ng (2002) also suggest that two factors are appropriate for our data set.
11We have experimented with using different (emerging and developed) variables to identify
the activity factors. The conclusions reported in section 3 are not substantially affected
by the choice of normalizing variables. Furthermore, estimating the factors from different
blocks of data, i.e., the two blocks described in section 2.2, and allowing the loading matrix
in equation (2) to be block diagonal also yields very similar results.
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Accordingly, to identify the structural innovations in the model as oil
supply shocks, developed-country oil demand shocks, emerging-country oil
demand shocks and other oil-specific demand shocks, we employ a mixture
of sign and zero restrictions, which are novel in this literature. In particular,
we restrict A0, defined in section 2 as:
uprod
udevAct
uemeAct
urpo
 =

x 0 0 0
x + + 0
x + + 0
x x x x


εoil supply
εdeveloped demand
εemerging demand
εoil-specific demand
 (4)
where + indicates that the effect of the shock must be positive, x leaves
the effect unrestricted, and, finally, zero imposes contemporaneous exclusion
restrictions.
The identification strategy imposes the following restrictions. First, crude
oil supply shocks (εoilsupplyt ) are defined as unpredictable innovations to global
oil production. The supply shocks are allowed to affect oil production, all
activity measures and the price of oil within the quarter, while oil produc-
tion itself responds to all shocks except the oil supply shock with a lag. This
implies a vertical short-run crude oil supply curve. As adjusting oil produc-
tion is costly, and the state of the crude oil market is uncertain, these are
plausible restrictions.12
Second, innovations to the activity factors for developed and emerging
economies (that cannot be explained by global oil supply shocks) are referred
to as, respectively, developed-country oil demand shocks (εdeveloped demand for
short) and emerging-country oil demand shocks (εemerging demand for short).
The real price of oil, as well as the developed and the emerging activity
factors, can be affected on impact by these demand shocks. As such, we allow
for a simultaneous reaction to demand shocks in emerging and developed
countries. This is plausible given the relative sizes of the economies (or
block of countries)13 and the potential interaction due to trade and financial
integration. Moreover, compared to standard recursive identification, the
advantage of our identification strategy is that it is insensitive to whether
the developed factor is ordered above the emerging factor or vice versa in
the VAR.14 However, this makes column two and three of the sign restriction
12Baumeister and Peersman (2012a) estimate the price elasticity of oil supply to be very
small in our estimation period, consistent with the view that the short-run supply curve
is nearly vertical.
13At the end of 2009, the emerging and developed economies in our sample accounted for
approximately 32 and 47 percent of world GDP based on purchasing-power-parity.
14In the robustness section, we will see that using a recursive identification strategy will
yield results that are not robust to the ordering of variables.
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matrix equal, and to fully identify the structural shocks, we impose two
additional sign restrictions on the short-run impulse responses: To identify
εdeveloped demand, we impose that the response of devAct−emeAct > 0, and to
identify εemerging demand we impose that the response of emeAct−devAct > 0.
The restriction implies that after an emerging-country demand shock (that
increases activity in emerging countries), activity in developed countries is
also restricted to increase, but by less than in the emerging countries (and
vice versa for a developed-country demand shock). This type of restriction
allows us to identify demand from different groups of countries (regions).15
All sign restrictions are set to hold for 2 quarters only.16
Finally, other innovations to the real price of oil that cannot be explained
by εoil supply, εdeveloped demand or εemerging demand are referred to as oil-specific
demand shocks (εoil-specific demand). Although this shock captures all other oil
market specific shocks not explained by the other shocks in the model, Kilian
(2009) argues that such a shock primarily captures precautionary demand for
oil driven by the uncertain availability (scarcity) of future oil supply.
With minor modifications, the sign restrictions are implemented follow-
ing the procedure outlined in Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010) and Mumtaz and
Surico (2009) and is explained in detail in Appendix D.
As is now well known in the literature, the sign restrictions will not yield
unique identification (see Fry and Pagan (2011)). That is, while the sign
restrictions solve the structural identification problem by providing sufficient
information to identify the structural parameters, there will be many models
with identified parameters that provide the same fit to the data. Accord-
ingly, the (median) estimated impulse response functions potentially repre-
sent responses to shocks from different models, and an analysis of variance
decompositions may be meaningless because the structural shocks considered
are not orthogonal.
To circumvent this problem, we adopt the following procedure: For each
set of reduced form parameters, we draw 1000 accepted candidate impulse
responses (based on A0 above), and compute the median impulse response
function among these accepted draws. We then compute the mean squared
error between all candidate functions and the median impulse response func-
tion. The impulse response function with the lowest score is stored. As
such, for each set of parameter estimates, the identified structural shocks are
orthogonal.17
15Restrictions on one variable relative to another have been applied previously by, among
others, Farrant and Peersman (2006) and Eickmeier and Ng (2011) but in a very different
context.
16The results are robust to altering the horizon by one quarter.
17The uncertainly bands presented around the impulse response functions below primarily
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3 Results
In the following, we first present the oil variables and the identified activity
factors for developed and emerging economies. Next, we investigate what
drives the real price of oil and oil production, and finally we examine how
the different regions and countries are affected by oil supply and oil-specific
demand shocks.
3.1 Factors
Figure 1, panels (a) and (b), displays the two observable series: global oil
production and the real price of oil. The figure (Panel (a)) shows significant
growth in the real price of oil during the economic booms in 1999/2000 and
2006/2007 and a decrease in the real price of oil during the Asian crisis and
the recent financial crisis. The economic booms and busts are also evident
in global oil production (Panel (b)), where production slows during the two
recessions and increases during the two expansions. Furthermore, there is also
evidence of a slowdown in global oil production during 2002/2003. The dates
coincide with the Venezuelan unrest (strike) and US attack on Iraq (second
Persian Gulf War). Figure 1, panels (c) and (d), displays the two key activity
variables used in the analysis: Emerging and developed economy factors. As
the figure shows, the two factors capture features commonly associated with
the business cycles in the each region over the last 20 years. Both the booms
and busts predating and following the Asian crisis near the end of the 1990s,
and the dot com bubble around 2001 are evident in the emerging and the
developed factors, respectively.
There is, however, a notable difference in how the recent financial crisis
has affected the two factors. The decline in the activity factor representing
the developed economies is much larger than any other previous decline in
that factor. For the emerging activity factor, the recent financial crisis also
caused large negative movements. However, compared to earlier downturns,
the recent crisis does not seem particularly different. Additionally, the recov-
ery in the emerging activity factor has been stronger than in the developed
economy factor.
Although the factors should capture common movements among the coun-
tries in each group, the various countries may still have different contributions
represent parameter uncertainty and not uncertainty originating from the sign restriction
draws. Here it should be noted that the identification restrictions we employ are very
informative, i.e., the differences between the different sign restriction draws are not large.
This is because we employ a mixture of sign and short run restrictions. Further results
are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Observable variables and estimated factors
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Note: The figure shows the standardized values of the first differences of the logs of each
observable variable, i.e. the real price of oil and global oil production, and the estimated
activity factors (the median). The sample used in the VAR is 1992:Q1 to 2009:Q4, while
we use information from 1991:Q1 to 2009:Q4 to estimate the unobserved factors.
to the factors. In particular, some countries may be more correlated with
their respective factor than others. To illustrate this (and to further inter-
pret the factors), Table 3 in Appendix B displays the correlation between
the activity variables in each country and the developed and emerging fac-
tors. First, regarding the developed factor, the table indicates that with
the exception of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Norway, all developed
countries are highly correlated with the developed factor (as expected). For
Japan and New Zealand, however, the correlation with the emerging factor
(that contains many Asian countries) is slightly higher than with the de-
veloped factors. Clearly, location is important. For Norway, and to some
extent Australia, the correlation between GDP and either the developed or
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the emerging factors is low, suggesting a more idiosyncratic pattern in these
countries.
Regarding the emerging factor, the results for the Asian and the South
American countries are more diverse. While the Asian countries are highly
correlated with the emerging factor, three of the South American countries
(Argentina, Chile, Mexico) and South Africa are slightly more correlated
with the developed factor than with the emerging factor. This indicates that
the Asian countries account for the majority of variation in the emerging
factor.
3.2 What drives oil prices?
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses in the model. Each row contains the
responses of a specific variable to the four different shocks. To compare the
developed-country and emerging-country demand shocks, we normalize both
shocks to increase activity in their respective regions by one percent. The
oil supply shock is normalized to decrease oil production by one percent,
while the oil-specific demand shock is normalized to increase the real oil
price by an initial 10 percent. While the normalization of the two demand
shocks allows us to compare the contributions of developed and emerging
countries, the normalization of the two ’oil market’ shocks is selected to
facilitate comparison with previous studies.
Beginning with our focal question, what drives oil prices, we examine the
bottom row. While demand in both the developed and emerging countries
increases the real oil price significantly for 1-2 years, the effect of the normal-
ized emerging-country demand shock is by far strongest of the two demand
shocks (increasing oil prices by an initial 20 percent versus 10 percent for the
developed-country demand shock). Interestingly, a shock to the emerging ac-
tivity factor also has the strongest effect on oil production (upper row), which
increases significantly for a year. While demand in developed economies also
increases oil production, the effect is not significant.
Next, we present our results on the explanatory power of the two oil
market (oil supply and oil-specific demand) shocks. A one percent disruption
in oil production due to an oil supply shock eventually increases the oil
price by 5-10 percent. The delayed response may suggest that oil consuming
countries have accumulated oil inventories that they can draw upon in the
event of production shortfalls, delaying the oil price response. Moreover, if
oil deliveries are based on future contracts, it might take some time before
supply disruptions affect prices.18
18However, the response is not significant.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses
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Note: The developed-country and emerging-country demand shocks are normalized to in-
crease respectively developed activity and emerging activity by one percent. To facilitate
comparison with earlier studies, the oil supply shock is normalized to decrease oil produc-
tion by one percent, while the oil demand shock is normalized to increase the real oil price
by 10 percent. The normalization has been done after adjusting the size of the shocks
such that they reflect the standard deviation of observable variables. Thus, for oil supply
and demand shocks we have used the sample standard deviations for the quarterly growth
rates in oil production and oil prices (roughly 0.9 and 16). For developed and emerging
demand shocks we have used respectively the sample standard deviation of US and China
GDP growth (approximately 0.7 and 1.3). The dotted lines display 90 percent confidence
intervals, while the solid lines are the point estimates.
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The last shock, interpreted in Kilian (2009) as a precautionary oil-specific
demand shock (ultimately driven by expectations about future oil supply
shortfalls), triggers an immediate and sharp increase in the real price of oil
(normalized to increase by 10 percent). Such expectations can change almost
immediately in response to, e.g., exogenous political events, and therefore
tend to increase prices without any subsequent effects on oil production.
Turning to the reverse causality, we ask, what are the effects of the two
oil market shocks on the macro economy? First, a disruption in oil produc-
tion that eventually increases the real oil price by 5-10 percent permanently
reduces activity in developed economies by approximately 0.5 percent (sec-
ond row). However, the same shock causes activity in emerging countries to
increase, although the standard error bands are wide (third row).
A shock to oil-specific demand, normalized to increase the real price of oil
by an initial 10 percent, slightly reduces GDP in the developed countries (0.2
percent), while GDP in emerging countries initially declines, then increases
marginally.19
Variance decompositions for the real price of oil and oil production, dis-
played in panels (a) and (b), respectively, in Figure 3 allow us to compare
the relative contributions of all shocks. The figure confirms the results found
above. The emerging activity factor is far more important than the developed
activity factor in explaining variance in the oil price and oil production. In
fact, for 1-2 years, approximately 40 percent of the variation in the oil price
is explained by emerging demand shocks, while developed demand shocks
explain approximately 15 percent. Turning to oil production, 40-50 percent
of the variation is explained by emerging demand shocks, while less than 10
percent is due to developed demand shocks. Therefore, we conclude that
demand in emerging countries is more than twice as important as demand
in developed economies in explaining the variance in the oil price and up to
five times more important in explaining the variance in oil production.
Our results suggest that the emerging countries have higher income elas-
ticity than the developed countries. Typically, as a country becomes more
developed (richer), the growth in petroleum use declines (as the country
produces less manufacturing goods and more services), and hence income
elasticity also declines. Indeed, in our sample, we find that emerging coun-
tries in Asia and South America have income elasticities close to unity, while
the average across developed countries is approximately 0.5. Consistent with
19Following both an oil supply and an oil-specific demand shock, the uncertainty bands
around the responses in the emerging activity factor are particularly large. This most
likely reflects the fact that the emerging market economies are less homogenous than
the developed economies, as observed in the correlation numbers reported in Table 3 in
Appendix B.
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Figure 3: Variance decomposition
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Note: The bars display the variance decomposition with respect to the shocks for horizons
4, 8 and 12 quarters. The widest bars correspond to the shorter horizon.
this, Hamilton (2009) has suggested that while the income elasticity of oil
consumption in the US has declined over time (to 0.5), the income elasticity
in newly industrialized countries may (still) be closer to unity.
Turning to the oil supply shocks, Figure 3, Panel (b), shows that these
shocks explain a small share of the variation in the real price of oil. This
is consistent with findings in Baumeister and Peersman (2012b), who use
a time-varying SVAR approach to demonstrate that oil supply shocks have
become a less important source of oil price movements in recent years. That
oil supply shocks explain a small amount of the variation in the real price of
oil in our sample is therefore not unique, and as expected.
Finally, the oil-specific demand shocks explain the remaining 40-50 per-
cent of the variation in the real price of oil after 1-2 years, but a negligible
share of oil production at all horizons. The results in Figure 3 reflect the
average contributions of the various shocks over the last two decades. To
examine the different periods in greater detail, Figure 4 plots the accumu-
lated contribution of each structural shock to the real price of oil based on
a historical decomposition of the data. In particular, Panel (a) shows that
for each quarter from 1992 to 2009, the real price of oil in levels (solid line)
and the real price minus the contribution from the emerging market shocks,
i.e., what the real price of oil would have been had there been no emerging
demand shocks (dotted line). In panels (b), (c) and (d), the dotted line
displays the real price of oil minus the respective contributions of demand
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Figure 4: Historical shock decompositions
(a) Oil price without emerging demand
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Note: The solid lines display the actual oil price. The dotted lines display what the oil price
would have been if we exclude one of the structural shocks. The bars show the difference
between the solid and dotted lines. A positive value indicates that the structural shock
contributed to increase the price of oil.
from developed countries, oil supply shocks and oil-specific demand shocks.20
Panel (a) in the figure emphasizes the importance of emerging markets as
drivers of the real oil price. This was especially pronounced in the middle
of the 1990s and from 2002/2003 and onwards. In fact, demand in emerging
markets added approximately 20 dollars to the peak oil price (approximately
55 dollars in real terms) in 2008. Thus, in our sample, the strong positive
contribution from emerging economies has been steadily increasing and was
only interrupted by the East Asian crisis (1997/1998) and the broader global
20We scale the initial values such that the total variance explained by each structural shock
(the bars in Figure 4) is in accordance with the variance decompositions reported in Table
3.
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economic downturn around 2001.
However, demand in developed countries negatively contributed to the
real oil price throughout much of the sample period (Panel (b)). Only during
the period leading up to the onset of the global financial crisis did developed
economies contribute to driving up the oil price. Interestingly, the negative
contribution from the developed countries resembles the results for the ag-
gregate global demand shocks identified in Kilian (2009), especially during
the 1990s. However, from 2005 onwards, Kilians’ aggregate demand shocks
contribute to the significant increase in the price of oil. As our results show,
when we differentiate between developed and emerging countries, most of
the increased demand is attributed to emerging economies. The contrast-
ing results for emerging and developed economies has not been previously
documented, but are well in line with the changes in global oil consumption
patterns, where, e.g., the share of total world oil consumption attributed
to non-OECD countries has grown by approximately 40 percent since the
beginning of the 1990s.
The results in Panel (c) reiterate the discussion above; oil supply shocks
have contributed little in explaining oil price fluctuations over the last two
decades, a finding supported by a number of recent studies. However, as
described in, e.g., Hamilton (2011), the only geopolitical events that have
potentially affected world oil production since 1992 were the Venezuelan un-
rest and the second Persian Gulf War, which both occurred around 2003.
Although the results in Panel (c) suggest that oil supply shocks increased
the price of oil during this period, the effects are small. This confirms the
finding in Kilian (2008a,b, 2009) that geopolitical events have a limited di-
rect effect on global oil production. As Kilian and Murphy (2012) show, such
events seem to matter more through their effect on speculative demand.
Finally, Panel (d), which graphs the historical contribution of oil-specific
demand shocks, reveals a more erratic pattern than any of the other shocks.
This is consistent with the interpretation that the shock primarily captures
precautionary demand for oil, driven by the uncertainty of the future oil
supply, as described in Kilian (2009). There has been a substantial debate
in the literature regarding the role of speculative trading in the oil market,
and particularly concerning speculation’s role in driving up the price of oil
since 2005. We cannot rule out the possibility that speculation accounts for
part of our identified oil-specific demand shock, but in any event, the results
presented in Panel (d) do not indicate that this shock plays as large a role in
increasing oil prices as the emerging-country demand shock. Furthermore,
the timing of the two largest contributions towards the end of the sample
period (2008:Q2 and 2008:Q3) does not suggest that this is a speculative
shock, as the global economy was clearly moving towards (or already in) a
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severe downturn at this point in time.
To summarize the results thus far, we find that while increased activity
in both developed and emerging economies drive up the real oil price, a
demand shock initiated in the emerging countries has a far stronger effect on
the oil price and production than a similar sized demand shock initiated in
the developed world. This is a new finding in the literature. Furthermore,
an historical decomposition of past shocks reveals that emerging economies
contributed to increases in the price of oil, particularly in the mid 1990s and
from 2002/2003 and onwards. Regarding the reverse relationship, we have
shown that while developed economies are negatively affected by the two oil
market shocks that drive up the real oil price (oil supply and oil demand
shocks), emerging countries are much less negatively affected and, in certain
periods, even positively affected. We turn to these issues in the next section,
where we examine in how the different geographical regions/countries within
the emerging and the developed blocks respond to the various shocks in
greater detail.
3.3 Region and Country details
Most recent empirical studies of the interaction between the oil market and
macro economy concentrate on the impact on either one or a few developed
(OECD) countries, e.g., the US in Kilian (2009) or France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the UK and the US in Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010). In addition,
many studies that assess the impact of oil prices on economic activity across
countries only consider net oil importing countries.21 Both of these features
might limit the generality of the findings.
An advantage of our FAVAR methodology is that we can analyze the
responses of various oil and macroeconomic shocks across a large panel of
countries within the same model simultaneously. Thus, we add a dimen-
sion to previous studies analyzing various countries separately. Below, we
investigate the individual country impulse responses provided by the FAVAR
framework, which we average at different geographical regions for the ease of
interpretation. That is, Figure 5, panels (a) and (b), displays the average re-
sponses in the level of GDP in Asia, Europe, North America (NA) and South
America (SA)22 to emerging and developed demand shocks, while Figure 5,
panels (c) and (d), displays the average responses in the level of GDP in the
same regions to oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks. The responses
21Empirical studies by Peersman and Van Robays (2012) and Bjørnland (1998, 2000) are
notable exceptions. Kilian et al. (2009) also quantify responses to oil price changes in oil
exporting countries but focus on external balances and not aggregate activity.
22SA also includes South Africa.
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are plotted at a two year horizon, and all shocks are normalized to increase
the real price of oil. Note that the impulse responses graphing the effect of
oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks on individual countries’ GDPs are
displayed in figures 9 and 10 in Appendix C.23
A shock to either developed-country or emerging-country demand (nor-
malized to increase activity in each group by one percent initially) has a
positive effect on GDP across all geographical regions, see Figure 5. Interest-
ingly, the emerging-country demand shock has by far the strongest effect on
Asia, confirming again that the Asian countries are the main drivers in the
emerging block. Following a developed-country demand shock, the positive
response in Europe is the strongest, followed closely by North America. Of
the emerging countries, those in South America are the most positively af-
fected by the developed market shock. This is consistent with observed trade
patterns, where a larger share of South America’s trade is with developed
countries than is the case for Asia. The responses to the oil supply and the
oil-specific demand shocks are more varied. Panel (c) of Figure 5 shows that
while economic activity in North America and Europe is negatively affected
following an adverse oil supply shock (that increases the real oil price), ac-
tivity in emerging countries in Asia and South America is much less affected,
activity in Asia even increases. Although the average response in Asia is
substantial, the response is particularly strong in Indonesia and Malaysia,
two energy rich countries (see Figure 9 in Appendix C). In South America,
only Brazil and Peru respond positively (cf. Figure 9), explaining why the
overall response in South America is negative in Figure 5.
The same divergence between the regions can also be found following oil-
specific demand shocks, see Panel (d). While all countries are now affected
negatively following such an oil shock, the effect is again less severe for the
emerging Asian and South American countries than for Europe and the US
(again, see the individual country impulse responses in Figure 10 in Appendix
C for additional details on the individual countries).
Therefore, we have demonstrated that the regions are differentiated, with
emerging countries in Asia and South America being more important drivers
of the real oil price, yet responding less severely to adverse oil market shocks.
Although these are strong and significant results, a concern is that the factors
might explain very different proportions of the variance in each individual
country’s activity measure. For example, the correlation between Norwegian
GDP and the developed activity factor is only 0.3, while the correlation
between US GDP and the developed activity factor is as high as 0.7 (see
23Additional graphs, including the impulse responses to the macroeconomic shocks, can be
given at request.
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Figure 5: Effect of macroeconomic and oil market shocks on GDP
in different regions (median)
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Note: y-axis (vertical axis) measures impulse responses after eight quarters. All shocks
are normalized to increase the oil price. See Figure 2 for further details.
Table 3 in Appendix B). To avoid a direct dependence on the factor loading
structure imposed in the FAVAR, we perform a final exercise where we regress
the structural oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks estimated in the
model on the individual countries’ GDP growth using standard OLS. This
also serves as a robustness check for the results plotted in Figure 5 that are
based on the regional average of the individual countries’ impulse responses.
The results are plotted in Figure 6.24
24A similar OLS regression was conducted in Kilian (2009) on the US alone.
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Figure 6: Regression of oil shocks on observable GDP
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(b) Oil-specific demand
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Note: The bars show for each country the accumulated regression coefficients from the
following regressions:
∆Xt,i = αi +
4∑
p=1
βp,ist−p + et,i
where ∆Xt,i is the observable GDP growth in country i at time t, α and β are coefficients,
and st−p are lags of the structural shocks (oil supply or oil demand) identified in our
model.
The findings confirm the baseline results that oil supply shocks (that
temporarily increase the oil price) stimulate GDP in all emerging countries
in Asia (again, most notably in the two oil producing countries Indonesia and
Malaysia), while in emerging South America and the developed countries,
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GDP falls, see Figure 6, Panel (a).25 There are, however, a few exceptions
to this picture: In Australia, Brazil, Germany, New Zealand, Norway and
Peru, GDP picks up temporarily (as in Asia). While all of the countries but
Germany are resource rich economies that may actually benefit from a higher
oil price (that is highly correlated with the price of other commodities), we
need to find other explanations for why economic activity in the remaining
Asian countries (and Germany) respond as they do. We will turn to this
issue in Section 3.5.
Regarding the oil specific demand shock (Figure 6, Panel (b)), most coun-
tries respond negatively as expected. The exceptions are, again, some Asian
countries (most notably Indonesia), which respond positively, implying that
the average response in Asia is less severe than in the other countries, a
feature we saw previously in panel (d) in Figure 5.
3.4 Comparison with previous studies
We are unaware of other studies that estimate the effects of oil supply and
oil-specific demand shocks on such a large panel of countries that also include
emerging countries. It is nonetheless interesting to compare our results to
recent studies that analyze the response in the US or a few other countries.
First, regarding the size of the responses to an oil supply shock that
decreases oil production by one percent, our results (of an eventual increase
in the oil price of 5-10 percent and a reduction in GDP by 0.5 percent), are
slightly stronger than those in, e.g., Kilian and Murphy (2012), and Kilian
(2009)26 but more in line with Baumeister and Peersman (2012b), who by
applying a time-varying SVAR model, find that for the period we examine,
oil supply shocks increase the real price of oil by approximately 10 percent
and reduce GDP by 0.5 percent.
Second, the responses to an oil-specific demand shock that is normalized
to increase the real price of oil by 10 percent (causing a decline in US GDP of
approximately 0.5 percent) are in line with real output responses in Peersman
and Van Robays (2009) and Aastveit (2012), while it is somewhat smaller
than the findings in Kilian (2009). More interestingly, note that in Kilian
(2009), global real economic activity increases after an oil-specific demand
shock. Conversely, we show that such a shock has a significant negative effect
25Note that Japan is negatively affected by oil supply shocks as are the other developed
countries.
26For instance, Kilian and Murphy (2012) finds that for a sample from 1973-2009, a 1 percent
decline in global oil production increases the real price of oil by approximately 4 percent
and reduces US GDP by 0.2-0.5 percent.
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on developed countries, while the effect on emerging countries is occasionally
positive, although not significant.
Regarding the few studies that distinguish between oil exporting and im-
porting countries, Peersman and Van Robays (2012), analyzing 11 developed
countries, find that following an adverse oil supply shock, economic activity
in energy exporting countries such as Norway and Canada temporarily re-
sponds positively. Similar results are also found in Bjørnland (1998, 2000).
However, while these studies typically attribute this to the fact that coun-
tries that respond positively are energy producing countries, we have shown
here that there are many energy-importing countries (in Asia in particular)
that also behave in this way. Therefore, this is not simply a story of energy
intensity in production. We turn to this now.
3.5 The Asian puzzle - country characteristics
The heterogeneity in activity responses across countries and regions to dis-
turbances in the oil market requires further examination. In particular, how
is it possible that the emerging activity factor is the main driver of the oil
price, yet emerging countries (in Asia in particular) are the least negatively
affected by adverse oil supply and oil specific demand shocks? And why
do countries such as Australia, Brazil, Germany, New Zealand, Norway and
Peru respond in a way that is so similar to the Asian countries?
First, as previously mentioned, some of the countries in the sample are
commodity exporters, where the terms of trade increase with higher commod-
ity prices (all of which are in periods highly correlated with the oil price).
Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, Norway and Peru are all important exporters
of energy, minerals or other raw materials. Some of the Asian countries (In-
donesia and Malaysia) also have a high share of net commodity exports in
total exports. However, this cannot explain the response in the majority
of Asian countries or in Germany. Moreover, as there are other energy ex-
porters that do not respond favorably to oil market shocks (e.g., Argentina
and Mexico), there must be other reasons for the observed heterogeneity.
A second hypothesis, (but related to the first) is that when oil prices
increase, there is a net income transfer from oil exporting to oil importing
countries, as the net exporters demand imports of goods and services. This
may have benefitted Asian countries in particular, as well as Germany, which
is the primary exporter in EU.
Third, the structure of a country matters. According to Hamilton (2009),
a key parameter in determining the consequences of an oil price increase is
the share of energy purchases in total expenditures. In particular, a low
expenditure share combined with a low price elasticity of demand will imply
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Table 1: Characteristics and correlations
(a) Correlations between country structure and IRF levels
Cons Inv Open
Oil supply -0.44 0.58 0.43
( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.01)
Oil demand -0.28 0.46 0.19
( 0.12) ( 0.01) ( 0.28)
(b) Regional structure
Cons Inv Open
Emerging Asia 55 33 145
Developed countries 66 23 60
Emerging South America 70 22 50
Note: Cons = consumption, Inv = investment, Open = export+import, all as share of
PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices. Results are based on the mean
of the indicators (over the sample period 1992 - 2009). In Panel (a), the second row for
each shock are p-values.
very small negative effects (if any) of an oil price increase. While the oil
consumption share in the US and other industrial economies has generally
been flat since the 1980s, it has risen sharply in emerging countries such as
China. However, as China began from a much lower level, per capita oil
consumption in the US is still 10 times larger than in China (cf. IMF WEO
2011). This may suggest that the (negative) price elasticity in the US is
larger (in absolute terms) than in China, and thus that GDP in the US and
other industrial countries responds more negatively to adverse oil market
shocks than in emerging countries.
In Table 1, we examine this issue in greater detail by analyzing to which
extent the composition of output is relevant. In particular, we examine
whether countries with a low consumption share and high investment share
are less negatively affected by higher oil prices, as investments are less re-
versible (due to long-term plans) than overall consumption. We also examine
whether the degree of openness is relevant, as a country that has most of its
capital in the export sector may be able to export some of the increase oil
prices to the importers, the price elasticities of which may be small.
Panel (a) in Table 1 reports the correlations between the impulse re-
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sponses from the two oil market shocks, an oil supply shock and an oil-specific
demand shock, with the means of the three relevant indicators, the consump-
tion share, investment share and degree of openness over the sample period
(1992 - 2009). The table confirms that countries with a high consumption
share have negative correlations with the two oil shocks, while countries with
high investment shares and degrees of openness will have positive correlations
with the oil shocks (oil supply shocks in particular).
Which regions match these features? Table 1, Panel (b), shows that
emerging Asia is noteworthy, with a low consumption share, high investment
share and a high degree of openness. For South American countries, however,
the picture is reversed (high consumption shares, low investment shares and
low degrees of openness), which may explain why despite being positively
affected by increased terms of trade, they do not respond positively overall.27
Finally, subsidies may also play a role. Price controls prevent the full
cost of a higher imported oil price from being passed through to the end
user, thereby dampening the responsiveness of consumption to increases in
prices. Studies in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook reports from 1999 and
2009 show that pervasive under-pricing of energy resources occurs in several
non-OECD countries, including China, India, Indonesia and South Africa.
This may also help to explain the small (and occasionally positive) effects of
oil supply and oil demand shocks in these countries. We leave this issue to
be explored further in another study.
4 Robustness
We repeatedly argued that the main drivers of the emerging economies factor
are the emerging Asian countries. This could be observed in the correlation
numbers in Table 3 in Appendix B, where the individual Asian countries are
more correlated with the emerging economies factor than emerging countries
in South America and in Figure 5 where emerging demand shocks signifi-
cantly affect the Asian countries.
In this section, we perform an additional exercise that examines the ro-
bustness of this finding and examines whether Asia or South America (or
a combination of both) drives the relationships between the oil-market and
the macro economy presented in Section 3. To do so, we split the sam-
ple of emerging countries into two blocks and estimate two different factors:
one consisting of emerging Asian countries and one consisting of emerging
27Note that Norway is an example of an oil producer with a consumption that is substantially
smaller than the average share in the developed countries. This may explain why Norway
may benefit from higher oil prices, at least temporarily.
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South American countries (including South Africa). Then, we sequentially
use these new factor estimates in our main model, as a replacement for the
original emerging economies factor. The results using the emerging Asian
factor are similar to the baseline results presented in Section 3, while the
results change when we use the emerging South American factor, see figures
7 and 8 in Appendix C. In particular, the emerging South American factor
explains slightly less of the variance in oil prices and almost half of the vari-
ance in oil production compared to the results in Figure 3. Therefore, we
again confirm that Asia is the primary driver of the results presented for the
emerging factor, but the role of South America is far from negligible.
As described in Section 2.2.2, an advantage of our identification strategy
is that we can identify distinct demand shocks that affect both the developed
and the emerging factors simultaneously. If simultaneity were unimportant,
however, then the FAVAR model could be identified using a standard recur-
sive identification strategy, ordering the developed factor above the emerging
factor or vice versa. Identifying such a recursive model, however, yields very
different results from our baseline model. In particular, now the activity fac-
tor ordered first will always explain more of the variation in the oil price than
the activity factor ordered second. Thus, simultaneity matters, which a stan-
dard recursive identification strategy does not adequately capture. Despite
this, recursive identification strategies nonetheless reveal that the emerging
factor plays an important role. First, the emerging activity factor will always
explain relatively more of the variation in the oil price than the developed fac-
tor, irrespective of where it is ordered.28 Second, emerging countries always
explain more of the variance in oil production than developed economies,
independent of the ordering of the emerging and the developed factors.
Furthermore, our main results are not particularly sensitive to the num-
ber of lags used in the transition equation. In fact, when we estimate the
model with two lags instead of four, the results are slightly stronger, imply-
ing that the emerging factor explains an even larger share of oil prices and
oil production. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the factor estimates
are not significantly affected by the choice of normalizing variables or to the
estimation method.29
28When the emerging factor is ordered first, it explains nearly twice as much of the variation
in oil prices than when the developed factor is ordered first. Similarly, when the emerging
factor is ordered last, it explains more than twice as much of the variation in oil prices
than the developed factor does when ordered last.
29The results from the robustness section are available upon request.
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5 Conclusion
We estimate a FAVAR model with separate activity factors for emerging and
developed economies in addition to global oil production and the real price of
oil. We study two main questions: 1) How demand shocks in emerging and
developed economies affect the real price of oil and global oil production, and
2) the effects of oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks on emerging and
developed economies. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly
analyze the contribution of developed and emerging countries on oil market
variables using a structural model. We have three main findings that are
robust to numerous robustness checks.
First, we demonstrate that demand shocks to emerging and developed
economies account for 50-60 percent of the fluctuations in the real price of
oil over the last two decades, supporting the finding in Kilian (2009) and
others of the importance of demand in oil price fluctuations.
Second, demand shocks to emerging markets, and in Asia in particular,
are far more important than demand shocks in developed economies in ex-
plaining fluctuations in the real price of oil and in global oil production.
Finally, we find that different regions respond differently to adverse oil
market shocks. While economic activity in Europe and the US is perma-
nently reduced following oil supply and oil-specific demand shocks, economic
activity in emerging countries in Asia and South America falls by much less,
and in some cases actually increases temporarily (at least following oil supply
shocks). While some of these results relate to the fact that many emerging
countries are commodity exporters that benefit from higher terms of trade,
we also find that countries with high investment shares in GDP and high
degrees of openness are less negatively affected by higher oil prices.
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Appendices
Appendix A Data and Sources
Most of the data series are collected from Ecowin. The few series we did
not find there, were taken from the following sources: Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) in China and Indonesia were found in the GVAR data set con-
structed by Pesaran et al. (2009). The series for industrial production (IP)
in Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico and the Netherlands were collected from
Datastream. The industrial production series in Denmark and Portugal were
taken from OECD, while industrial production in Norway was collected from
Statistics Norway.
All GDP series are at constant prices. The industrial production series
are volume indexes, and refer, with few exceptions, to the manufacturing
industry. For Argentina, China, Indonesia, Italy, Norway, Peru and Portugal,
we only found series for overall industrial production.
Lastly, some of the activity series do not span the whole time period used
in the analysis (1991:Q1 to 2009:Q4). To avoid excluding these variables
from the sample, we have applied the EM algorithm, as described in Stock
and Watson (2002), to construct the missing observations. However, experi-
ments conducted on a reduced sample, i.e. excluding the series with missing
observations, do not change our main conclusions.
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Appendix B Tables
Table 2: Oil production and consumption by countries
Country Production Consumption Net exporter
Developed Australia 0.64 0.87 No
Belgium 0.01 0.61 No
Canada 2.83 2.03 Yes
Denmark 0.29 0.20 Yes
Finland 0.01 0.21 No
France 0.09 1.97 No
Germany 0.13 2.74 No
Italy 0.14 1.83 No
Japan 0.11 5.36 No
Netherlands 0.06 0.89 No
New Zealand 0.05 0.14 No
Norway 2.93 0.22 Yes
Portugal 0.00 0.31 No
Spain 0.03 1.39 No
Sweden 0.00 0.37 No
Switzerland 0.00 0.27 No
United Kingdom 2.32 1.78 Yes
United States 9.04 19.19 No
Emerging Argentina 0.80 0.50 Yes
Brazil 1.59 2.06 No
Chile 0.02 0.23 No
China 3.45 5.17 No
Hong Kong 0.00 0.25 No
India 0.77 2.12 No
Indonesia 1.38 1.04 Yes
Korea, South 0.01 2.06 No
Malaysia 0.75 0.46 Yes
Mexico 3.42 2.00 Yes
Peru 0.11 0.15 No
Singapore 0.01 0.69 No
South Africa 0.20 0.47 No
Taiwan 0.00 0.83 No
Thailand 0.21 0.77 No
Note: Column three to five reports oil production and oil consumption in millions of barrels
per day, measured as averages for the period 1992-2009 (Source: EIA).
Table 3: Correlation with factors
Developed Emerging
Country Variable emeAct devAct Country Variable emeAct devAct
Australia GDP 0.09 0.35 Argentina GDP 0.20 0.25
IP 0.34 0.48 IP 0.36 0.38
Belgium GDP 0.41 0.78 Brazil GDP 0.44 0.41
IP 0.32 0.63 IP 0.51 0.41
Canada GDP 0.16 0.75 Chile GDP 0.24 0.32
IP 0.32 0.70 IP 0.37 0.41
Denmark GDP 0.19 0.56 China GDP 0.36 0.14
IP 0.04 0.43 IP 0.27 0.10
Finland GDP 0.26 0.80 Hong Kong GDP 0.78 0.47
IP 0.15 0.62 IP 0.43 0.33
France GDP 0.25 0.83 India GDP N/A N/A
IP 0.35 0.75 IP 0.19 0.24
Germany GDP 0.29 0.74 Indonesia GDP 0.54 -0.02
IP 0.20 0.68 IP 0.58 0.01
Italy GDP 0.42 0.80 Korea GDP 0.59 0.49
IP 0.43 0.83 IP 0.70 0.45
Japan GDP 0.63 0.52 Malaysia GDP 0.49 0.27
IP 0.66 0.46 IP 0.69 0.48
Netherlands GDP 0.17 0.78 Mexico GDP 0.26 0.67
IP 0.29 0.56 IP 0.16 0.61
New Zealand GDP 0.47 0.43 Peru GDP 0.31 0.08
IP N/A N/A IP 0.45 0.33
Norway GDP 0.08 0.33 Singapore GDP 0.75 0.43
IP 0.17 0.51 IP 0.54 0.32
Portugal GDP 0.10 0.66 South Africa GDP 0.24 0.56
IP -0.07 0.24 IP 0.40 0.61
Spain GDP -0.02 0.75 Taiwan GDP 0.56 0.52
IP 0.31 0.76 IP 0.61 0.27
Sweden GDP 0.32 0.83 Thailand GDP 0.48 0.22
IP 0.32 0.78 IP 0.63 0.42
Switzerland GDP 0.17 0.69
IP 0.33 0.62
United Kingdom GDP 0.23 0.84
IP 0.37 0.80
United States GDP 0.27 0.71
IP 0.36 0.81
Mean 0.27 0.65 Mean 0.45 0.35
Note: Column three to four, and seven to eight report the correlation between observable
activity variables and the identified emerging and developed activity factors. IP is an
abbreviation for industrial production. N/A are missing values.
Appendix C Figures
Figure 7: Variance decomposition: Asia only
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Note: The bars display the variance decomposition with respect to the shocks for horizons
4, 8 and 12 quarters. The widest bars correspond to the shorter horizon.
Figure 8: Variance decomposition: South America only
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Note: The bars display the variance decomposition with respect to the shocks for horizons
4, 8 and 12 quarters. The widest bars correspond to the shorter horizon.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses: Oil supply shock
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Note: The figures show the responses of GDP (in percent) in a given country after a
normalized oil supply shock (see Notes to Figure 2 for further details).
Figure 10: Impulse responses: Oil-specific demand shock
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Note: The figures show the responses of GDP (in percent) in a given country after a oil
demand shock that increases oil prices with 10 percent (see Notes to Figure 2 for further
details).
Appendix D Implementation of sign restric-
tions
We implement the following algorithm for each draw of the reduced form
covariance matrix Ω:
1. Let Ω = PP ′ be the Cholesky decomposition of the VAR covariance
matrix Ω, and A˜0 = P .
2. Draw an independent standard normal n x k matrix J, where n is the
size of the block (e.g. developed and emerging) and k is the number of
shocks affecting that block according to the block exogenous structure
outlined in section 2.2 and equation 4. Let J = QR be the “economy
size” QR decomposition of J with the diagonal of R normalized to be
positive.
3. Compute a candidate structural impact matrix A0 = A˜0 · Q˜, where Q˜
is a N x N identity matrix with Q′ in the n x k block associated with
the developed and emerging block in equation 4.
4. Redo step 1-3 for the next block of data.
If the candidate matrix satisfies the sign restrictions, we keep it. Otherwise
the procedure above is repeated. The imposed signs can also be restricted
to hold for many periods, in which case the candidate matrix must be past
into the impulse response function before validation.
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